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Abstract   
This paper offers an appraisal of the relationship between sociology and 
philosophy grounded in a critique of the former discipline’s failure to contend with 
the dominance of neoliberalism in the run up to the financial crisis. In the first 
instance, it considers the prevailing philosophical ethos after the end of the Cold 
War and what Francis Fukuyama (1992) called the ‘End of History’. It observes 
the emergence of an increasingly unchallenged political monad around the 
conjoined principles of liberal democracy and neoliberal economics and its 
ascendance to the status of socio-historical universality despite becoming 
increasingly problematic. The second half of the essay then carries this political-
philosophical analysis into an exploration of contemporary sociology and its 
approach to the intellectual critique of dominant ideas and structures. It proposes 
that an emergent strain of philosophical relativism has inadvertently moved us 
away from some of the critical responsibilities of the traditional intellectual and 
eroded our capacity to offer practical alternatives to overwhelmingly neoliberal 
governance. The article ends on the hopeful note that a slight change in tack might 
push us toward reclaiming responsibilities and revitalising the debate on social 
transformation.    
 
Introduction 
On Sunday 12 October 2008, Alistair Darling, then Chancellor of the Exchequer, left the 
Washington headquarters of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and boarded a flight back 
to London. Darling’s experience of his otherwise unremarkable business class flight, 
however, was marred by external turbulences of which few of his fellow passengers would 
have been aware. The City of London, the financial bedrock of the British economy, was in 
trouble and an implosion to rival the 1930s was well and truly on the cards. Unless a plan 
could be finalized before markets reopened the following morning the public might have 
headed out to work to find cash points inoperable, credit/debit cards unusable and the whole 
economy facing a terminal collapse of its monetary base. 
Hours from disaster, the highest echelons of government convened in a bid to prevent 
capitalism reaching crisis point. Less than a year after Northern Rock’s nationalization, the 
rest of the financial sector was staring down the same surfeit of ‘bad debt’. Once again, the 
state would have to step in. To do nothing risked wholesale economic collapse and everything 
that implies – national bankruptcy, mass social unrest, economic shockwaves pulsating over 
Europe and the rest of the world and perhaps even irreparable damage to the public standing 
of neoliberal capitalism itself. The following morning, only hours after arriving home, the 
Chancellor stood grave and haggard beside the Prime Minister. With all the resigned 
solemnity of a declaration of war the British state declared its intention to do everything in its 
power to buttress financial capitalism in the name of ‘businesses, working families and home-
owners’ (BBC News, 2008).  
For decades prior to this financial impasse we had been told that business, including 
international finance, should be given as much freedom as possible and that the only way to 
ensure future prosperity was to legislate for a libertarian, light touch approach to economic 
regulation (Chang, 2010). This represented the fundamental neoliberal economic principles 
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that politicians of all parties had stood for since 1979. For three decades our political leaders 
have stood for ‘the freedom of private firms to seek profit in any way they could’ 
(Wallerstein, 2011: 6) and the undesirability of state regulation unless it aids the functioning 
of free markets (Harvey, 2005). This ‘economic liberalism’ was, and remains, the linchpin of 
British politics: an unimpeachable truth, without question the best way to organise an 
economy, a system that seemed somehow connected to all the utopian imaginings of classical 
liberalism; the rational economic actor, unencumbered by state interference, driving the 
economy forward with his/her entrepreneurial dynamism and thirst for profit. In little else 
have we more earnest faith than concepts such as ‘innovation’, ‘entrepreneurialism’ and 
‘economic growth’  (Deutschmann, 2001). Indeed, the political class was so convinced of the 
moral rectitude of economic liberalism that Francis Fukuyama (1992), along with many of his 
contemporaries, drew the conclusion that it represented the end point of our philosophical 
development. It was to be the ‘end of history’, the ‘final form of human government’.  
Ultimately, this might appear to be a conviction that ‘politics’, the ‘art of living 
together and… search[ing] for the common good’ (Rancière, 2005: 23), has fulfilled its 
promise and must now turn its hand to preserving and administering neoliberalism’s high-
water mark. Consequently, any sense of political bipolarity seems to have fallen away to be 
replaced by a political culture that sees its role extending no further than technocratic 
stewardship (Žižek, 2010). In this context, the purpose of this paper is twofold: first, to 
examine in a little more detail the political and philosophical tenor of liberal society at the 
‘end of history’ and then to look at how recent directions in sociological theory might be 
related to late-twentieth century political monism. 
Liberal Universalism 
The starting point for this paper is a widely acknowledged development in the political 
outlook of much of the industrialized world since the late nineteen-eighties. Slowly but surely 
competing discourses of political economy were replaced by the dominant, absolutely 
hegemonic neoliberalism at Fukuyama’s ‘end of history’. Progressive ideals, fundamental 
ideological oppositions and attempts to transform human conditions gave way to ‘the end 
point of mankind’s ideological evolution and the universalization of western liberal 
democracy as the final form of human government’ (1992: 4).  
According to Boltanski and Chiapello (2005), capitalism has become an entirely 
different beast over the last few decades; seamlessly combining increasingly polarized social 
relations with rhetorical devices traditionally associated with various forms of progressivism 
(liberty, justice and fairness). Allied to this process was the willingness of much of the left to 
eschew traditional narratives (class struggle, collectivism and injustice) in favor of the politics 
of possessive individualism and private identities. ‘Liberty’, once associated with the struggle 
against overt repressive domination, has been recast as ‘liberation [that] is predominantly 
conceived as setting free the oppressed desire… to be who one wants to be, when one wants 
it’ (Ibid. 434). This liberty to pursue hedonic desires is far less inimical to capitalism than 
traditional conceptions of human freedom. More than that, however, it also constitutes a 
fundamental redefinition of what it means to be ‘free’, placing much more emphasis on the 
many individualized opportunities afforded by neoliberal capitalism and far less on collective 
action and ‘the common good’. In this sense, we have arguably reached a new form of 
capitalism which, rather than exercising power in overtly oppressive ways, ‘enchant[s] its 
subjects with dreams (of freedom, of how your success depends on yourself, of the run of 
luck which is just around the corner, of unconstrained pleasures…)’ (Žižek, 2009: 26) thus 
facilitating internalisation of the most capital-friendly socio-economic conditions and broad 
acquiescence to its various necessities even where we might point to a number of serious 
flaws.  
While a more detailed discussion of neoliberal trajectories would perhaps be 
desirable it is sadly beyond the bounds of this paper. The crucial point to carry forward is that 
this ‘new spirit of capitalism’, otherwise known as neoliberalism, has largely succeeded in 
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realigning much of our social outlook with the needs of unfettered capital accumulation. 
Traditional Protestant values such as saving and frugality, for instance, hold little profitability 
for an economic system based on all manner of complex financial operations (including the 
practice of ‘securitization’, which involves packaging and reselling debts on the international 
money markets, [see Ferguson, 2008]) and consumer culture. The rise of neoliberalism, 
however, was accompanied by an individualist ethos of personal solipsism in which the 
ubiquitous opportunity to ‘buy now – pay later’ kicked off the upward progression of 
outstanding consumer debt that very nearly finished off our economy. What is more, despite 
applying downward pressure to wages, widening the gap between rich and poor and relying 
heavily on a ready supply of easily obtained credit, neoliberalism looked inordinately 
successful until its fortunes took a downward turn with the beginning of the ‘credit crunch’. 
For all intents and purposes, it appeared to usher in an era of low unemployment, steady 
growth, relative stability and generalized prosperity (see Elliott & Atkinson, 2007; Toynbee 
& Walker, 2010) that further served to legitimize neoliberalism in the eyes of the general 
population. This apparent success contributed to the belief structure that is the subject of this 
essay – that neoliberalism can provide for all of our needs and that a ‘single economic and 
political system… [is] coming into being throughout the world’ (Gray, 2007: 104). 
Neoliberalism and utopian liberal democracy now occupy the space left by radical, 
progressive narratives and the possibility of a better world. 
The structure of human society at the ‘end of history’ appears to have become a one 
horse race in which all the other runners fell at early fences by not sufficiently distancing 
themselves from totalitarianism and revolutionary change. It seemed that to strive for radical 
social change was inevitably to fail – in such circumstance neoliberalism seemed the safest 
bet. Alain Badiou has described this as a ‘conviction that to want something better is to want 
something worse’ (2010: 1), which has significantly bolstered neoliberalism and its emergent 
position as the only decent, humanistic social order available to mankind. In this vein, 
neoliberal ideologues have often claimed that liberal economic theory ‘provided a mode of 
seeing and a way of organizing the world that could diagnose a country’s fundamental 
condition, frame the terms of its public debate, and propose remedies for its improvement’ 
(Mitchell, 2007: 1) all in ways that would not conflict with the competitiveness and self-
interest that they often assume innate to our species. Again according to Badiou 
Depending on what moment we examine, the [twentieth] century appears to operate on 
one of two maxims: one, (operative today, for example) calls for renunciation, 
resignation, the lesser evil, together with moderation, the end of humanity as a spiritual 
force and the critique of ‘grand narratives’. The other – which dominated the ‘short 
century’ between 1917 and the 1980s – inherits… the will to ‘break the history of the 
world in two’, and seeks a radical commencement that would bear within it the 
foundations of a reconciled humanity (2007: 31).  
This marked socio-historical shift remains absolutely crucial to understanding our current 
social predicament. In place of the will to split world history that made the twentieth century 
such an Age of Extremes (Hobsbawm, 1995), of radical political movements and myriad 
social innovations, recent decades have been characterized more by renunciation of 
revolutionary change followed by retreat toward socio-economic liberalism. We have 
experimented with putting ever more of the commons back into private hands, tried scaling 
back labor protection and removing constraints from international finance and placing great 
faith in (neo-)liberal economic principles that have undoubtedly proved flawed on many 
previous occasions (see Mackay, 1852; Galbraith, 1994; Kindleberger, 2000; Reinhart & 
Rogoff, 2009). In the space of three decades we all but disavowed the gains made during the 
decades of the social democratic settlement after World War Two and reinstituted the 
preceding classical liberal order in response to nineteen-seventies economic stagnation 
(Frieden, 2006) and the claims made by politicians on both sides of the Atlantic that 
neoliberalism could deliver us safe from turbulent seas. 
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Neoliberalism may well be ‘sufficiently productive enough to be generally accepted’ 
(Gray, 2007: 113) and opening economic borders has undoubtedly allowed more people to 
participate in trade (Sorman, 2009).  Yet as much as it appears ‘more tolerant – unbothered 
about ‘family values’, no longer pervasively homophobic, less deeply racist and… not so 
fixated on issues of class’ (Gray, 2007: 114) there are a host of demerits that must also be 
mentioned. Ours is a society that appears to be rapidly becoming more unjust, insecure and 
unequal (Elliot & Atkinson, 1998; Wilkinson & Pickett, 2009; Dorling, 2010; Hutton, 2010; 
Southwood, 2011), increasingly debt-ridden (Pettifor, 2006; Elliot & Atkinson, 2007; 
Langley, 2009; Harvey, 2010), with a dislocated population prone to signs of stress, anxiety 
and depression (Lane, 2000; Schumaker, 2006; Freeman & Freeman, 2008). Internationally, 
neoliberalism appears even more suspect, implicated in similar atrocities to those often 
thought constitutive of progressive collectivist regimes. It has, for instance, a terrifying 
propensity for aiding despots and dictators when their continued power serves its interests 
(Johnson, 2002; Kinzer, 2003; Pilger, 2007), and a habit of interfering in foreign sovereignty 
for the same reasons whilst promoting an economic system prone to institutionalized 
instabilities and atrocities of its own (see Chomsky, 2004; Bakan, 2005; Losurdo, 2011). 
Nowhere, however, is neoliberalism subjected to the same level of skepticism, apprehension 
and outright revulsion as more collectivist alternatives. Cambodian killing fields, the 
Holocaust, purges, pogroms, gulags and the Chinese Cultural Revolution are trotted out at the 
slightest provocation by defenders of neoliberalism while our war crimes, environmental 
negligence and disregard for foreign human life are acknowledged only in passing. Without 
getting embroiled in the interminable argument over the most murderous ideology, it should 
immediately be noted that the historical character of leftist progressivism appears to rest on its 
many failures but not its successes while neoliberalism’s reputation appears to rest on a few 
limited successes. Yet in Britain and the United States, not to mention Continental Europe, 
the Social Democratic era was anything but a failure. In fact, it was a ‘golden age of 
capitalism’ in which long-term economic stability and sustained growth (Arrighi, 2010; 
Callinicos, 2010; Wolf, 2010) combined with dramatic social innovations that went a long 
way to improving everyday life. Funded by highly progressive taxation the Social Democratic 
state ploughed revenue into welfare programs that smoothed over some of the ingrained 
social inequalities generated by pre-war ‘neoclassicism’ (the philosophical antecedent of our 
‘neoliberalism’) whilst improving general security and quality of life for industrial 
populations (Standing, 2011). Still, the failures of leftist collectivism are seen to be inevitable 
but those of neoliberalism are only episodic lapses, certainly nothing that should stop it 
getting just one more bite of the cherry. This, according to Alain Badiou, is the foundation of 
current political orthodoxy in the developed, liberal west 
‘[W]e have here, almost unchanged, all the arguments of the American anti-communism 
of the 1950s: socialist [read ‘radical’, ‘leftist’ or ‘progressive’] regimes are loathsome 
despotisms and bloody dictatorships. At the level of the state, this socialist 
‘totalitarianism’ must be contrasted with representative democracy, which, while it is of 
course imperfect, is by far the least bad form of government… Because it has ended in 
failure all over the world, the communist hypothesis is a criminal utopia that must give 
way to a culture of ‘human rights’… the cult of freedom (including, of course, freedom 
of enterprise, the freedom to own property and to grow rich that is the material guarantee 
of all other freedoms)’ (2010: 1-2) 
It is also an impasse that has affected our lives much more over the last few years as some of 
the veneer of success that served to legitimate neoliberal capitalism has been stripped away 
by internal instabilities and subsequent political attempts to shore up its foundations. Over the 
last few decades, however, the notional supremacy of liberal capital has become more than 
just an article of faith expressed by various economists, ideologues and politicians. Apparent 
success transformed emergent neoliberalism into a full-blown millenarian ideology ripe for 
global exportation. Gray notes that ‘purged of the doubts that haunted its classical exponents, 
the belief in the market as a divine ordinance became a secular ideology of universal progress 
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that in the late twentieth century was embraced by international institutions’ (2007: 105). 
Such millenarian liberalism became the latest expression of the enlightenment faith that we 
are evolving toward a universal civilization. In this vein, recent decades have been dominated 
by confident expectation that liberal democracy will, at some point in the future, ascend to 
power in every corner of the globe. More importantly, the activities of western-dominated 
international institutions (the IMF, the World Bank, the UN and NATO, for instance) could 
help turn aspiration into concrete political reality and should institute policies toward such 
ends.  
The boost given this (re-)emergent ideology by the end of the Cold War seems to 
have led Anglo-American leaders to the possibility that domestic success could be replicated 
elsewhere. It seems that ‘led by [Margaret] Thatcher, western governments told the countries 
of the former Soviet block that if they wanted prosperity they had to import the free market’ 
(Ibid. 117). The notion that the same policies that pulled the Anglophone economies out of 
the nineteen-seventies stagnatory mire could be replicated in other contexts quickly became a 
truism of twentieth century politics. A new breed of economists, the ‘Chicago boys’, set about 
exporting liberal economics to South America, while the IMF and World Bank did their part 
through structural adjustment conditions requiring economic liberalization as a pre-requisite 
of international aid.  
Many of the world’s developed nations entered the twenty-first century playing host 
to a millenarian political order that they actively aspired to export around the globe. This core 
proposition of western ideological faith still seems to form a substantial part of the operating 
principles of international institutions despite a number of historical refutations. The fall of 
Soviet Communism in 1990 was taken as a sign that all states within its zone of influence 
would adopt western-style liberal democracy and the free market. However, as a consequence 
of attempts to install free market liberalism, post-communist Russia  ‘produced… a species of 
mafia-dominated anarcho-capitalism’ (Gray, 2002: 133) that further impoverished the 
Russian people and perhaps pushed them toward the autocratic leadership of Vladimir Putin 
and Dmitry Medvedev. In much the same vein, various South American peoples continue to 
display a marked fondness for popular leftist regimes (such as those led by Hugo Chavez, Evo 
Morales and Raul Castro) after their fateful experiences with US-orchestrated liberalism 
during the last century.  Yet, as events abroad appear to challenge the neoliberal version of 
history it only seems to be asserted with more vigor. The terrorist attacks on London and New 
York in the last decade, for instance, were not taken as signs of an increasingly frustrated 
world at odds with the international conduct of neoliberalism but of the necessity for a 
generational ‘war on terror’ to rescue foreign peoples from their own inadequacies.  
What we have perhaps seen emerge during recent decades is a new political monad 
that conceives of its own existence as the triumph of human history. Neoliberalism has 
arguably become a subject of ‘universal notions that do not just describe ‘how things are’ [in 
our particular socio-historical context] but serve to prescribe and insist that this is ‘how things 
must be’ [in all possible contexts and futures]’ (Williams, 2011: 5). In other words, it seems 
to have become a new object for the enlightenment faith in historical progress – a 
‘universality’ that appears to be ‘the only game in town’ (Žižek, 2000: 95). In the coming 
pages, I want to explore the sociological response to this growing sense of political certainty. 
How did sociological intellectuals react to neoliberalism’s claims to represent some form of 
historical truth, the end point in a developmental process that was always heading this 
direction?  
Relativising the Universal 
Based on the first section of this essay we might be reminded of an observation common 
amongst leftist philosophers such as Fredric Jameson and Slavoj Žižek, that it is now ‘easier 
to imagine the end of the world than the end of capitalism’. Certainly we might observe that 
while alternative socio-political narratives ‘no longer exists as a coherent programme of 
government’ (Cohen, 2007: 11) much of our media and scientific output consists of 
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apocalyptic scenarios and doom-laden assessments of various ‘risks’. From science fiction’s 
obsession with post-apocalyptic landscapes and zombie plagues to the predictions of rising 
sea levels, desertification, resource wars and population crashes associated with modern 
climate science (see, for instance, Lovelock, 2009; Vince, 2009; Dyer, 2010), it remains 
difficult to escape the notion that society genuinely could come crashing down. Equally, 
however, we are also faced with the possibility that neoliberalism ‘seamlessly occupies the 
horizon of the thinkable’ (Fisher, 2009: 8) to such an extent that it seems certain to see us all 
out. Faced with such overwhelming conviction from a political order quite as problematic as 
millenarian neoliberalism we might be forgiven for enquiring after competing conceptions of 
the social good.  
Of course practical alternate visions of how society should work do not spontaneously 
erupt from nothing but are often the product of ‘intellectuals’ with the time and inclination for 
patient analysis and deep thought. Thus we concentrate our efforts on those who might claim 
a measure of intellectualism. To the extent that intellectuals have been responsible for 
establishing an ‘atmosphere of hostility to capitalism’ (Schumpeter, 1942: 145) we should 
probably acknowledge that their relationship with seats of power has often been a little 
fraught. From Galileo and Marx through to the modern day, intellectuals have often stood in 
opposition to accepted dogmas and taken-for-granted assumptions, pursuing instead what 
they individually perceived to be ‘the truth’. What’s more, we might note that sociology, at 
least as much as any other social science discipline, has its roots in and perhaps owes many of 
its successes to various creeds of radical intellectualism. According to the late Eric 
Hobsbawm, for instance, the history of sociology remains inextricable from Marxism 
‘From the late 19th century on, sociology, the attempt to understand the operations of 
society, overlapped with both Marx and the more general aim of changing and not 
merely interpreting the world… The extraordinary expansion of higher education since 
the 1960s had given it [sociology] unusual prominence… and political radicalisation had 
made it a subject of choice for many students’ (2011: 390).  
More than that, however, many late-twentieth century sociologists asserted that being ‘an 
intellectual’ involves extending expertise into the political realm and applying it to the 
creation of a society that better fulfils the needs and requirements of its population (see 
Bauman, 1987; Bourdieu, 1988, for example). This function we supposedly perform by being 
more concerned with ultimate values (truth, justice and decency) and raising uncomfortable 
questions about prevailing beliefs and customs. According to Frank Furedi, ‘being an 
intellectual implies social engagement… It involves… the assumption of social responsibility 
and taking a political stand’ (2004: 35).  
In essence, the social function of intellectualism might seem to involve holding to the 
possibility of solving social problems through the mutability of social structures and their 
governing ideas. If this is a fair description of what it means to be involved in an intellectual 
enterprise then it would seem to be directly inimical to any system of thought that holds 
existing structures to be immutable, such as that outlined above. In this context, the question 
crucial to our ongoing analysis is what the affect of millenarian liberalism’s ideological 
monism might have been on such an avowedly critical enterprise determined to maintain its 
distance from seats of power and, ostensibly, at least, associated with various forms of 
radicalism (it is perhaps worth mentioning that this does not just mean those working on ‘the 
left’. Under neoliberal universality traditional one-state conservatism may be just as ‘radical’ 
as any collectivist alternative)? 
Might some disavow their earlier convictions as impractical youthful idealism and drift 
perceptibly toward millenarian neoliberalism? Might others cling on for dear life, holding to 
the radical promise despite looking increasingly out of touch? In others 
[T]he radical impulse would persist, but would be forced to migrate elsewhere. The 
governing assumptions of such an epoch, one imagines, would be that the system itself 
was unbreachable; and a great many radical positions… could be seen to flow from this 
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gloomy presupposition. One might expect, for example, that there would be an upsurge 
in interest in the crevices and margins of the system – in those ambiguous, indeterminate 
spots where its power seems less implacable (Eagleton, 1996: 2) 
Yet following from the image of the traditional, politically engaged intellectual we might also 
expect a profusion of wide-ranging research on the many downsides of millenarian liberalism, 
motivated by various ideals and commitments to the mutability of social structures. In truth, 
there are many examples of all of these different possibilities, be it sociology’s multifaceted 
engagement with consumerism or a generally fairly suspicious take on the culture that has 
developed alongside neoliberal capitalism (see, for instance, Hall et al, 2008; MacDonald, 
2009; Hall, 2012). However, such qualification must be met with the possibility that 
concurrent developments on the other side of the political fence might appear to favor only 
one of these possibilities.  
As neoliberalism began to move back toward the political mainstream, the collectivist 
successes of post-war social democracy (less social inequality, relative prosperity and rapid 
technological advancement, for example) radically altered the constituency of the democratic 
left. ‘Hard graft in traditional factories, mines and transport industries was giving way to 
automation, the rise of the service industries and an increasingly feminized labor force’ (Judt, 
2010: 86). These transformations, further spurred by nineteen-seventies economic stagnation, 
gave the ‘old left’ a dwindling constituency less able to count on the loose collectivism of 
traditional working class communities. In their place came a new generation born into an era 
of relative prosperity and significant movements toward social justice. Where the ‘old left’ 
had accepted intrusive top-down legislation as the necessary price of social justice and 
economic security, the ‘new left’ was far more at home to disenchantment with political 
institutions, differentiation and demands for the state to respect individualized ‘rights’.  
Fairly hesitantly at first, the nineteen-seventies and even more so the nineteen-
eighties would see the left move away from engaging an increasingly universalistic version of 
neoliberal capitalism by holding to competing political narratives. Instead, the left took to 
questioning the claims of universalism at every turn by adopting a philosophical posture that 
celebrated diversity and opposed universalistic values wherever they might rear their head. 
According to Furedi, this program drew much of its inspiration from universalizing capital – 
‘because western capitalism presented its values as universal, the new left unthinkingly 
became opposed to it [universality]’ (2004: 61).  
What we saw emerging was a ‘cultural turn’ toward ‘particularism, heterogeneity and 
difference’ that grounded its interpretations of everyday life in the language of relativism and 
relativistic conceptions of individual behaviour. Boudon, for instance, has noted that an 
emergent relativism (the perspective that values and ideas have no objectivity, or, more 
importantly, that they are fundamentally subjective and relate only to those holding them) 
may be a candidate for a new ‘secular religion’ in which we ‘tend to see all norms through 
‘culturalist’ spectacles: each ‘culture’ has its own norms and values’ (2004: 3). Such 
observations flow from the objective fact of human diversity – there are many moralities, 
many ways of seeing the world and of behaving within it and that these differ both between 
and within cultures. Yet the truly ‘relativistic turn comes when you transfer these perspectives 
into the first-person perspective of a moral agent… and you conclude that there is no one true 
morality but many’ (Lukes, 2008: 115).  
In more sociological terms, the emergence of such a relativistic approach to social 
phenomena refers to ‘adopting a particularistic worldview linked to the politics of identity’ 
(Furedi, 2004: 61). This particularism might then hold to the possibility that individuals living 
in a universalistic neoliberal society would find their own way to resist its dominance through 
individualized forms of self-expression without recourse to the realm of universalistic ideas, 
metanarratives and macro-processes. Hence, their perspective would be ‘culturally relative’ to 
beliefs held in isolation and would allow such individuals to hold out against a universalistic 
conception of the social good. In such circumstances we might see a profusion of sociological 
research that expressed ‘enthusiasm for diversity, multiplicity, and the agency of consumers 
actively transforming their lifestyles’ (Dean, 2009: 9) and the development of an ‘intense 
International Journal of Criminology and Sociological Theory, Vol. 6, No. 4, December 2013, 114-127 
 
 
121 
 
sense of cynicism toward causes and ideas’ (Furedi, 2004: 74) that arguably amounts to a 
rejection of socio-political mutability’s revolutionary promise. 
Perhaps unsurprisingly, given British sociology’s roots in the left-of-centre discourses 
of the latter half of last century, much of this new philosophical orientation seems to have 
been adopted in one form or another. Rojek and Turner, for instance, observe that ‘decorative 
sociology’ (a tendency to focus on culture and its interpretation with a habit of reading 
politics into cultural activities) ‘has taken root with such tenacity that it is now the most 
powerful tendency in critical cultural studies and cultural sociology’ (2000: 639). More than 
anything else this appears to have involved an orientation toward social theory in which 
macro-interpretations of social phenomena as the result of broad processes felt across social 
structures are pushed to the sidelines while individualized local images of diversity are 
foregrounded. In other words, ‘Large claims about macro-processes – modernization, 
secularization, rationalization – are viewed by [sic] skepticism, while arguments that favor 
local images of postmodern society as a fragmented and diverse social reality are readily 
accepted’ (Boudon, 2004: vi).  
Most importantly, however, the over-riding assertion appears to be that no matter the 
claims of a singular historical universality it all comes to naught when faced with the 
multitudinous interpretations of individuals making their own way in a fragmented and 
diverse social reality. Some of the most prominent facets of modern sociology appear to flow 
from this relative diminution of macro-processes in favor of a micro-sociology that studies 
the social world in ever-smaller discreet units. On one hand, for instance, we seem to have 
developed a marked fondness for methodological complexity, empiricism and claims to 
objectivity that mirror aspects of the natural sciences, while on the other we have the 
emergence of concepts such as ‘identity politics’ (also known as ‘life’ or ‘lifestyle’ politics) 
that might seem to privilege the individual over macro-processes. While we are sadly lacking 
the space for full analysis of such expressions of this new philosophical orientation the latter 
is perhaps worth a little more detail. 
Identity politics ‘concerns political issues, which flow from processes of self-
actualization in post-traditional contexts, where globalizing influences intrude deeply into the 
reflexive project of the self, and conversely where processes of self-realization influence 
global strategies’ (Giddens, 1991: 214). These ‘life politics’ provide a basis on which to claim 
that individual behaviour in almost any area of social life can be ‘political’, harboring each 
individual citizens’ approval and/or disapproval, consent and/or rejection, of large-scale 
social structures and the powers that be. In other words, the Foucauldian determination that 
there is no such thing as ‘universal truth’, that metanarratives should be met with skepticism 
and suspicion, appears to have been supplemented with the far more optimistic possibility that 
individuals construct ‘truths’ of their own in the face of neoliberal universality and that these 
relative micro-conceptions of the world provide a refuge for ‘free thought’, dissent and 
political expression to the extent that all sociology needs to do is document them. 
At its extreme, groups of academics dedicated their careers to rooting out hidden 
subversive meanings in pop lyrics with Madonna’s career a popular choice (see, for example, 
Schwichtenberg, 1993; Robertson, 1996) or analyzing the cultural subtexts of American teen 
dramas such as Dawson’s Creek or Buffy the Vampire Slayer, the latter spawning 
‘buffyology’ within the academy (see Badman, 2002 for an extensive list of academic work 
on the subject). More generally, clothing styles, music genres, shopping habits and film were 
all analyzed for sub rosa political implications (see Philo & Miller, 2001 for a useful 
summary) as we cast around looking for signs of life in the barren wastelands of neoliberal 
universality.  
At this point it is probably worth reiterating that this is not the only trend in evidence 
in sociological theory. Many alternate strands are immediately apparent with only the most 
cursory glance at the literature available to cultural sociologists. For every vaguely 
hagiographic text on the political meanings of various consumer proclivities there is another 
portraying the same activities as anxious, defensive reactions to an increasingly insecure 
culture. For every work seemingly convinced that we live in an increasingly free and 
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prosperous society there is another arguing the same conditions to be signs of yet greater 
alienation and exploitation. In fact,  ‘The critique of alienation and spectacle has blossomed 
and spread to the point it has become the most common vulgate because it is the only 
discourse of consolation that we have’ (Baudrillard, 2010: 41). 
Nevertheless, to the extent that ‘the cultural turn’ and the implications of cultural 
relativism still form one of the main currents of sociological theory, we might note that it 
seems to be the product of a radical intelligentsia lacking an object capable of validating their 
commitment to a better, more egalitarian world.  The outcome, however, seems to have been 
to 
unambiguously reformulate the relationship between social science and social critique: 
the social sciences were no longer expected to perform a critical function; they expelled 
critique beyond their own boundaries, turning it into nothing but a subject of study. The 
task from now on would be to study the critical potential of intersubjective 
communication… or the different regimes of justification and critique used by actors in 
their everyday practices. In this way the social sciences followed the spirit of the times: 
in a spirit of universal democratization and liberalization, they gave up their critical 
privileges and delegated them to citizens themselves (Znepolski, 2010: 2-3) 
In other words, the direction taken by parts of the intellectual left after the cultural turn might 
seem to have delegated many of our critical responsibilities to individuals just going about 
their day-to-day lives. More than that, however, there remains a possibility that the tendency 
to focus our energies on elucidating individual experiences draws much of its inspiration from 
the universalizing spirit of capitalism that took hold during the nineteen-eighties. Obvious 
public success, apparent superiority to other socio-political discourses and emergent universal 
status seem to have dealt a blow to the interests of the radical intelligentsia that left us 
scrambling to find alternative ways to express dissent. However, instead of revitalizing 
intellectualism’s critical inclinations for an era of totalitarian liberalism, we seemed to set 
about studying the forms of critique built into the everyday activities of ordinary people. This 
is an approach that might appear to have a great deal in common with Terry Eagleton’s 
(1996) ‘gloomy presupposition’. 
What the recent history of our discipline perhaps indicates is that we may have fallen 
foul of the same problems that have plagued almost every quarter of the intellectual left for 
the last few decades.  Rather than oppose neoliberalism on its own terms, perhaps with an 
equally compelling universality of our own, we seem to have retreated down the rabbit hole 
of individual critical potential, delegating some of our intellectual responsibilities to everyday 
citizens, most of whom are preoccupied with just trying to get by in an increasingly 
inhospitable world  
Insofar as too many on the academic and typing left have celebrated isolation as freedom 
and consumption as creativity, we have failed to counter the neoliberalisation of the 
economy. Even worse – we have failed to provide good reasons to support collective 
approaches to political, social and economic problems… We gave in, gave up, before we 
needed to. We actually didn’t lose. It’s worse than that. We quit [Original emphasis] 
(Dean, 2009: 4-5) 
Ultimately, we may be looking at a causal relationship between the emergence of neoliberal 
universality and the subsequent character of much sociological theory. Faced with an 
apparently incontestable, unassailably popular socio-historical narrative it seems as though 
academic sociology was all but forced to abandon its relationship with radical social ideals 
and the possibility of building a better world through mass political mobilization. In a world 
that apparently believed it had solved all the biggest philosophical questions of human 
existence, sociology seems to have adopted a new political disposition that re-forged the 
discipline in line with the conditions of emergent universality. In other words, late-twentieth 
century sociology’s renewed focus on the individual over and above macro-level social 
analysis allowed it to live on in a world system that apparently believed there was nothing to 
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be gained in challenging the currently dominant ‘master pattern’. However, in promulgating 
ideas such as identity politics, in getting involved with ‘subcultures’ – by definition 
marginally different cultural forms existing within an over-riding narrative – sociology 
appears to have accepted neoliberalism as a fait accompli and moved the discipline away 
from its roots in strident social critique.  
Instead of meeting neoliberal universality head on and challenging it with alternative 
ideals, sociology set about relativizing universality, trying to show how it did not necessarily 
entail homogeneity, that even within conditions of ideological monism we might still find 
groups that differ, often in very marginal, unimportant and distinctly uninteresting ways, from 
dominant social ideals. In other words, going to great lengths to show that universality 
remains relative only to those who subscribe to its belief system and that critique can 
dynamically emerge from within such a monopolar political form. The problem we face is 
that as neoliberal universality has become increasingly troublesome, sociology appears to 
have moved away from the possibility of solving said problems through the mutability of 
macro-processes and structures leaving us struggling to participate in the growing debate 
around the future direction of our society in the wake of the financial crisis. Sociology, we 
might suggest, has transformed itself into a deeply unthreatening, vaguely liberal enterprise 
with little to contribute when it comes to the apparent decay of the liberal order.  
Conclusion (What is to be done?) 
This paper set out to explore a putative relationship between the emergent philosophical 
concept of neoliberal universalism and recent directions taken by social theory. The last 
decades of the twentieth century saw the emergence of a remarkable consensus around the 
social, political and economic legitimacy of neoliberalism. Slowly but surely the fundamental 
ideological oppositions that typified the middle decades of the twentieth century (see 
Hobsbawm, 1995; Badiou, 2007) fell away, replaced by a political monad that seemingly 
believed we had found a final solution to the great ethical problems of human history. It 
seemed that longstanding questions such as how we should live and what makes a ‘good’ 
society had been answered by the return of the free market and neoliberalism’s ascent to 
political dominance. Now the business of politics lay only in neoliberalism’s preservation. 
Any attempt to radically improve our social conditions, was believed to be the product of 
hopeless romanticism and perhaps even a dangerous risk likely to open the door for despotic 
government. 
What’s more, this determination has arguably produced a number of stagnant 
societies in which a host of worsening social problems – not least of which is the financial 
crises of the last few years – never seem to effect change in any of the underlying coordinates 
of our social existence, such as unfettered markets and ‘free trade’. In this way we might be 
reminded of Boltanski and Chiapello’s (2005) description of a society in which a booming, 
profoundly restructured capitalism breezily co-exists with social deterioration and rampant 
inequality whilst facing little in the way of real political opposition. Neoliberalism has, 
despite its many problems, become the single viable socio-historical narrative that explains 
how human society as a whole could and should work. It is, by all accounts, a universality 
that has become ‘the only game in town’. 
In this context we enquire after traditional sources of competing narratives, 
particularly sociological intellectuals and their longstanding affinity for political critique. 
What we perhaps find, however, is a discipline that appears to have delegated many of its 
critical responsibilities in a spirit of universal liberalization, expelling (political) critique 
outward to citizens themselves then setting about documenting their individual responses to 
an increasingly inhospitable society. Instead of devoting critical attention to neoliberal 
universality large sections of leftist sociology, particularly cultural sociology, have discovered 
an infinite source of diversity, multiplicity and agency in which individuals have gained the 
means and scope to transform their lives in fluid and dynamic ways while not challenging the 
basic co-ordinates of our social existence. This failure to meet neoliberalism head on arguably 
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amounts to an intellectual retreat that opened the door for the re-adoption of classical 
liberalism on the socio-economic stage. 
What’s more, the rise of neo-capitalist universality and the allied process of 
intellectual retreat are, perhaps, the final sum of the Chancellor’s harried flight home and the 
mass bailout of the financial sector hurriedly finalized on his return. That we found ourselves 
in a situation where the only viable course of action barring wholesale economic collapse was 
to transfer billions of pounds of public money into private coffers for the express purpose of 
keeping our economy afloat must be indicative of a deeply imbalanced society. That the 
bailout attracted broad public support from the general population (Žižek, 2010) or that little 
progress has since been made in legislating away the worst excesses of financial markets 
further indicates the deep-seated malaise that seems to have overtaken traditional political 
bipolarity.  
Once again, we are faced with the conclusion that neoliberalism ‘occupies the horizon 
of the thinkable’ (Fisher, 2009: 8) to such an extent that we couldn’t see anything out the 
other side but the abject misery of complete socio-economic shutdown. In this vein, perhaps 
sociology, instead of doggedly pursuing individual critical potential, could take a role for 
itself amongst those trying to shed some light on the system we are in now and what we might 
find out the other side. Jean Baechler (2007) has noted that sociology has always been closer 
in its approach to disciplines such as philosophy and history than the natural sciences, in 
which case we might take a lead from those trying to turn critical philosophy to meeting our 
circumstances head on. Alain Badiou, for instance, recently proposed a triumvirate function 
for his discipline that would allow it to ‘think the transformation of life’ 
First, to throw light on the fundamental choices of thought. ‘In the last instance’… such 
choices are always between what is interested and what is disinterested. 
Second, to throw light on the distance between thinking and power, between truths and 
the state. To measure this distance. To know whether or not it can be crossed. 
Third, to throw light on the value of exception. The value of the event. The value of the 
break. And to do this against the continuity of life, against social conservatism (2009: 
12). 
While not wanting to step on his toes, there is no discernible reason why sociologists could 
not put more effort into highlighting the distance between any conception of an ethical society 
and its current form, then set about illustrating just how valuable a radical break could be.  
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